The Institute of Governmental Studies has released its report on redistricting in California (the one which was originally scheduled to be released in October but which was postponed at the last minute). They summarize their findings thusly:
1. Plans that balance all the criteria (population equality, congituity, compactness, minimizing county splits, preserving the VRA seats and enhancing competitiveness) would create between 12-14 Congressional seats (13 on average) in the range between a 3 percent Republican registration advantage and a 10 point Democratic registration advantage.
2. Districts in that range will be contested more heavily but small registration margins do not necessarily predict turnover since other factors matter significantly such as incumbency, money advantages, national tides and candidate quality. In the redistricting plan drawn by the Court in 1991, only 14 of the 260 California Congressional races (ie 5%) between 1992 and 2000 resulted in party turnover.
3. Plans that maximized competitiveness and ignored city/county lines and the integrity of the VRA districts create on average as many as 18 to 25 districts in the potentially competitive range, but they would be subject to serious legal challenges and much controversy in the affected local communities.
4. Political geography and the VRA give the Democrats a big edge in safe seats over the Republicans. No plan, no matter who draws it, can change that. Barring a heavily biased Republican plan, the Democrats are unlikely to drop below 26 seats in Congress and the Republicans could fall to 14.
5, Out of eighty Assembly districts, plans that aim to maximize the number of potentially competitive seats could produce between 21 to 30 seats in the 3 point Republican and 10 point Democratic registration range.
6. Among plans that balance other redistricting criteria, between 12 to 17 seats (15 on average) would fall in that range.
7. Similar to the Congressional races, due to incumbency advantage and other factors, a slim party registration difference does not necessarily translate into a narrow vote margin. Among the 400 Assembly races that took place between 1992 and 2000, only 22 (6%) resulted in party turnover. Ten of those races occurred in districts with a party registration difference in the 3 point Republican and 10 point Democratic range. Contrary to conventional expectation, none of these party turnover races happened in districts with a party registration difference within 3 percentage points. In fact, several Republican candidates were able to win in districts with high concentration of Democratic voters.
8. The conventional belief that majority minority districts tend to be non-competitive and dominated by the Democratic Party still holds. Yet with changing demographic composition and partisan alignment, it is now feasible to draw one or two minority districts that might be potentially competitive.
9. Plans that placed a heavy emphasis on compactness and minimizing city/county splits made it hard to achieve the political goals of more competitive seats and preserving majority minority representation.
The summary goes to great length to convince readers that “competitive districts” aren’t actually important and won’t necessarily produce greater turnover , and implies that the entire effort is somewhat misguided. As one of the few liberals who endorsed Proposition 77, I’m annoyed by that; it seems off-topic and somewhat irrelevant for the study to be making that point.
But that doesn’t obscure the big finding in the report: there is a strong tension between increasing competitiveness (on the one hand) and preserving compactness and minimizing city/county splits (on the other). The two are not entirely compatible goals.
So which of these goals is more important? If a new ballot measure comes down the pike, which course should that measure enshrine as paramount? I tend to favor preserving communtiies of interest and minimizing city/county splits; minimizing city/county splits makes the entire process less confusing to the voter, and preserving communities of interest makes it more likely that the representative will represent the community; it’s hard to do that when there is, so to speak, no community.
But competitiveness was the rallying call of many who supported Proposition 77. Will they be happy with a solution that reduces competitiveness in the name of increasing compactness?
(Hat Tip: California Insider.)